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LONDON STALEMATE REVEALS HURDLES CONFRONTING PEACEMAKERS

WASHINGTON.—The Administration in Washington does not share the gloomy disappointment that characterizes most newspaper reports and comment on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. It cannot be denied, however, that the sessions of the Council, which opened on September 11, produced no agreement on any of the issues which were considered by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China. The London meeting seriously raised the question whether peace settlements can be achieved by any means other than a conference restricted to the Big Three. For, despite Foreign Commissar Molotov's agreement that France and China could be present at all sessions and that France should vote on the Italian peace treaty and the French plan for the control of the Ruhr, he later withdrew his consent to this arrangement. The Potsdam agreement, according to Mr. Molotov, excluded France and China from treaty discussions since they had not been armistice signatories. When the United States, Britain and France refused to accept this view, the meeting reached an impasse, and compromise proposals offered by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin failed to break the stalemate. Yet despite this disappointing situation, none of the Allies has shown an inclination to abandon international councils in favor of a lone-wolf policy.

MUTUAL SUSPICIONS. Since the United Nations conference for world organization held last spring in San Francisco, the powers have been plagued by an impossible paradox—a belief that world affairs can be managed partly by the formula of Great-Power equal cooperation and universal responsibility, and partly by the old balance-of-power formula. Continued reliance on a contradictory set of policies, national and international, would assure the failure of future conferences and destroy

the doctrine of cooperation. Sharply aware of this possibility, the State Department probably will oppose unilateral acquisition by this country of the islands formerly mandated to Japan. The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, to open at Rio de Janeiro on October 20, may be used by the State Department as an occasion for seeing to it that the Act of Chapultepec is geared into an international system.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes left for the London meeting determined to press for solutions to problems by formulae of international cooperation. Nevertheless, he fed the controversy between the advocates of single-handed and cooperative action by letting it be known that he favored permitting Italy to administer its former African colonies as trustee for the United Nations. Later Byrnes reversed his position, and the draft memorandum on Italy, presented to the meeting by the United States on September 15, therefore adhered strictly to an internationalist formula. It urged that Libya and Eritrea be granted their independence after a 10-year trusteeship period under an administrator appointed by the Trusteeship Council and assisted by an advisory committee of seven, including an Italian representative. For Italian Somaliland, a similar arrangement was proposed, but without any fixed date for independence.

CONFUSED INTERNATIONALIST THINKING. Demonstrations of faith in the United Nations formula at the meeting in the Lancaster House ballroom were insufficient to allay suspicions so long as strong mistrust existed outside Lancaster House. The United States and Britain found it difficult to accept in full faith the Soviet espousal of cooperation when Moscow newspapers were objecting to Western criticism of the one-party régimes in Bulgaria and Rumania as undemocratic. The U.S.S.R. also found it

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difficult to rest its hopes for security on cooperation with Britain and the United States at the very time strong voices in France and Britain were advocating creation of a Western bloc of states and as long as the United States hesitated to share its atom bomb secret with the Soviet Union. Retention of this secret strikes the Russians as evidence either of fear of Russia or of bad intentions toward that country.

The United States, as a matter of fact, has growing confidence in its ability to get along with Russia, but dispatches from London report profound British apprehension. The weekly commentary distributed by the official British Information Services for September 28 proposes that the United States and Britain act together to withstand Soviet diplomacy. Soviet-British mistrust at London was intensified by the seeming eagerness of the Russians to retain unmoled their influence over the affairs of the eastern European countries and by British anxiety to maintain a special position in the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

British concern was prompted primarily by Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov's press conference statement on September 18 that the Soviet Union was interested in Eritrea and Tripolitania. The Soviets further disturbed the British by proposing the exclusion of France and China from matters relating to southeastern Europe, although the powers accepted on September 15 the Soviet request that the Council hear the representatives of Poland, the Ukraine and White Russia on the Italian settlement. Russia's entrance into Mediterranean affairs may have been doubly forceful because—despite the assumption in the San Francisco charter that each great power has an interest in the affairs of every region—the Western nations have been extremely reluctant in consulting the Russians on questions like Tangier and Syria.

The Council meeting puts the United States in the position of being the only power able to improve Anglo-Soviet relations and lead the world into a policy of true cooperation. However, at a time when the world most needs American leadership, this coun-

try's influence is in danger of declining. The United States displays little idealism in its present approach to world affairs, and already lacks the outstanding military strength it possessed only seven weeks ago when Japan agreed to surrender. The widespread desire of American soldiers in Germany to get out of the Army, together with the vagueness of the Administration program for maintaining the Army and Navy in considerable peacetime strength, deepen Britain's reluctance to demonstrate more faith in the U.S.S.R. Other governments begin to wonder whether United States lack of interest in military matters will not soon be followed by a declining interest in foreign affairs. President Truman noted this possibility when, at his press conference of September 25, he stressed the danger in a return to isolationism.

MEETING ARRANGED IN HASTE. A technical hazard in the way of a successful Council meeting was the haste with which it was arranged. It opened so soon after the Potsdam Conference, which created the Foreign Ministers' Council, that none of the delegations had time to prepare adequately for the talks. Aside from a draft on Italy, Secretary Byrnes took to London only a set of general principles applicable to any situation but explicit for none. There was no agenda beyond the Potsdam agreement that the Council would discuss treaties of peace for Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. The resulting atmosphere of vagueness in Lancaster House heightened the mistrust and uncertainty which darkened the meeting.

Yet the delegations looked ahead to ultimate agreement on matters they could not settle in London, and the Foreign Ministers agreed to send their deputies to Istria to study further the problem of Trieste, on which the Soviet Union and the United States advanced clashing proposals. They arranged for the establishment at a coming meeting in Washington of a commission to guide policy for the occupation of Japan. The meeting demonstrated again that extraordinary patience on the part of both officials and peoples is an essential quality in foreign relations.

BLAIR BOLLES

WHAT CHANCE FOR EFFECTIVE HEMISPHERE ACTION IN ARGENTINA?

As reports of a mounting crisis in Buenos Aires reach the United States, it daily becomes more evident that the only alternative to civil war in Argentina is decisive international action to dislodge the Farrell-Perón government. That the Argentine imbroglio has assumed such unusual importance in the international scene is perhaps due to the fact that the world has seldom seen so striking a spectacle of a people and a government standing embattled against each other. Now that an abortive revolution has given the government an opportunity to move against its opponents—those innocent of any part

in the "revolution" as well as those directly involved—it has become clear to what lengths Vice-President Perón and his followers are willing to go to preserve power. The wave of arrests which followed the discovery on September 25 of General Arturo Rawson's plans for an armed uprising was calculated not to deprive Argentina of all political, business and intellectual leadership, as it first threatened to do, but to strike terror to the heart of the opposition, which showed its strength and representative character in a remarkable street demonstration of half a million persons on September 19. Perhaps the

development of greatest significance in these last hard months has been the conversion of the conservative privileged classes to the opposition. Thus it was not only the leaders of radical opinion in Argentina who were being sought for imprisonment by the police but such leaders as the presidents of the Rural Society, the Stock Exchange, and the Industrial Union; former Foreign Ministers Carlos Saavedra Lamas and José María Cantilo; and the rectors of five national universities. To the extent that this may signify the willingness of conservative elements in Argentine society to cooperate with the left in establishing a stable and progressive government, it is a fortunate circumstance for the post-Perón era.

FROM PASSIVE TO ARMED RESISTANCE?

With the accession of the powerful Radical party to the democratic front, the ranks of the opposition are united. Yet there is little that can be done to bring about government reform through ordinary political channels owing to the reimposition of the state of siege prohibiting freedom of press and assembly, and to the restrictions placed on political parties by the Electoral Statute, announced on August 1, under which the state can control their organization. However, the calling of a combined general strike and lockout is contemplated, which would so completely paralyze the economic life of the nation that the military would have to hand over the government to the Supreme Court. Under Argentine law that institution would then be required to call elections within 90 days. Only the optimists in the opposition believe, however, that the government would tolerate a strike without resort to arms; and there are those, like the Argentine labor delegates to the World Trade Union Conference, who talk openly of armed rebellion as soon as the united democratic forces can make concrete plans. Argentina's conscript army, in the last analysis, holds the key to a peaceful internal solution of the existing impasse. The opposition may base its hopes for the successful outcome of the strike in the anticipated reluctance of

the enlisted man to take up arms against his own people in a cause for which he can have no personal sympathy.

CHAPULTEPEC—POSSIBLE FORMULA.

While the Argentine people must be the chief protagonists in the events leading to a change in government, there are indications today that they would be less hostile to the idea of active intervention by the United Nations than was the case a few months ago when the situation did not look so dark. This suggests the advisability of re-examining inter-American policy toward Argentina in the light of the Farrell-Perón government's omission to implement its obligations under the Act of Chapultepec, and involves deciding whether the actions of that government are of purely domestic significance or constitute a threat to hemisphere security. If this language has the ring of familiarity, it is because the problem has not to this date been confronted and dealt with effectively. The failure of the Mexico City policy to stamp out Axis influences in Argentina has been admitted, and a more realistic approach is promised by the fact that Assistant Secretary Braden returned from Buenos Aires convinced that there is an "extremely dangerous" Nazi element which has been organized into a "vast Nazi-Fascist espionage network," the existence of which is confirmed by official statements of the government itself.

Mr. Braden has emphasized his view, based on first-hand acquaintance with the Argentine scene, that the people of that country are the best insurance against an extension of the underground Axis menace and should be given ample encouragement to settle the situation themselves. If, however, the present impasse should give way to civil war, the Act of Chapultepec offers a formula by which the American nations may act immediately to isolate Argentina from diplomatic and economic communication with the rest of the continent. On October 20 the American Republics will convene at Rio de Janeiro to consider the question of drafting the Act of Chapultepec into permanent treaty form. Before that time it must be decided whether Argentina, as a signatory to the Act, shall attend a conference in which its own situation will be in the foreground as the possible test case of a new regional security system. It is unlikely however, that the American nations will agree on the advisability of imposing sanctions on the recalcitrant member of the hemisphere union, if only because of the practical economic considerations involved. A year ago, a similar attempt was abandoned, chiefly because of the urgent need of the United Nations for Argentine foodstuffs. Its wheat and beef shipments are no less vital today as Europe faces starvation. To find other ways of eliminating the very real danger to inter-American unity and peace

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that the Buenos Aires government represents, without sacrificing the good will of the Argentine people, will severely test the statesmanship of the new men in the State Department charged with the direction of Latin American affairs.

OLIVE HOLMES

FRANCE PROHIBITS GOVERNMENT OPIUM MONOPOLIES IN INDO-CHINA

The French Provisional Government informed the Acting Secretary General of the League of Nations on July 13, 1945, that it confirms the principle of absolute prohibition of opium smoking in all territories in the Far East under French authority. This declaration refers in the first place to Indo-China.

Thus, France joins with the Netherlands and Great Britain in ending an ancient evil which has caused friction for a hundred years between European powers and China. The unequivocal declaration by Great Britain in the House of Commons, November 10, 1943, that His Majesty's Government have now decided to adopt the policy of total prohibition of

opium smoking in the British and British protected territories in the Far East which are now in enemy occupation, and the Netherlands Government's declaration "to take all necessary measures for the discontinuance of that habit . . . in the whole area of the Netherlands Indies, which measures will include the abolition of the Opium Monopoly," leave only Portuguese Macao, Thailand and the territory formerly held by Japan outside this progressive plan, now that France has taken its place with the other great powers in this matter.

American opinion is watching with sympathetic interest French plans for a new relationship between France and Indo-China, plans which include projects for increasing public health services and improving labor standards. Suppression of the government licensed shops for sale of smoking opium will give an immediate, tangible proof that the French government is sincerely interested in the physical and social welfare of the inhabitants.

HELEN HOWELL MOORHEAD

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Against These Three, by Stuart Cloete. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1945. \$3.50

The story of South Africa's modern beginnings, woven about the careers of three dominant and vigorous men—Paul Kruger of the Boers; Cecil Rhodes, the imperialist; and Lobengula, the last of the Kaffir Kings.

Claims to Territory, by Norman Hill. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$3.00

While this book offers no solutions for frontier disputes arising out of World War II, Mr. Hill analyzes the nature of conflicting territorial claims and reviews the procedures available for settling such controversies.

The Sinews of Peace, by Herbert Feis. New York, Harper, 1944. \$2.50

The former adviser on economic affairs to the State Department offers in this well-written book his analysis of future international economic problems. Great stress is laid on the reciprocal trade agreements policy of the United States, but Mr. Feis points out that each nation must accommodate its national aims to the greater necessities of an international economic system.

Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore. Boston, Little, Brown, 1945. \$2.00

An expert on Far Eastern affairs offers a highly stimulating survey of the issues that face us in Asia. The many brilliant insights into current problems and their background make this "must" reading.

The United States in a Multi-National Economy, by Jacob Viner and others. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1945. \$2.00

These essays contain statements by outstanding authorities on international trade and finance, post-war shipping, the colonial problem and treatment of Germany.

Foreign Affairs Bibliography: A Selected and Annotated List of Books on International Relations, 1932-1942. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1945. \$6.00

Any one who wishes to follow international relations during this critical ten-year period can find a wealth of important references here. It is especially useful for libraries.

Problems of the Postwar World, edited by Thomas C. T. McCormick. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1945. \$3.75

This symposium, prepared for the most part by members of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, covers three wide fields: future economic problems, governmental affairs, and international relations. Subjects treated range from domestic questions like unionism, taxation and education to a discussion of America's foreign policy toward Germany, Russia and Britain.

Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties, by H. W. Arndt. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. \$3.75

A review of the national economic policies of the United States, Britain, France and Germany during and after the critical years of world depression. The author also briefly examines international economic action taken during the inter-war period.

The House of Europe, by Paul Scott Mowrer. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1945. \$3.75

Interestingly written observations by a most interested "inhabitant" of Europe's house from 1910 to 1933, while head of the Paris office of the *Chicago Daily News*.

Europe Since 1914 in Its World Setting, by F. L. Benis. New York, Crofts, 1945. \$6.00

A thorough revision of an extremely valuable guide to significant events of a memorable period.

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